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10.  The impact of innovation – 
comments on Uwe Cantner and 
Wolfgang Kerber
Andreas Heinemann
1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Evolutionary economics is a school of economic thinking which transfers 
basic concepts of biology to socio-cultural phenomena. Keywords are 
variation and selection: the competitive process is one of trial and error 
in which different strategies compete with each other. Many new ideas are 
tried and tested on markets. Markets decide on selection: only some of 
these ideas are successful; others are sorted out. Nobody can tell before-
hand which ideas will survive. The evolutionary approach is genuinely 
dynamic: the focus is on the economic development in time, and not so 
much on the results in a given moment. Prominent precursors of the evo-
lutionary school are Schumpeter and Hayek. Schumpeter criticized the 
ideal of perfect competition and underlined the role of entrepreneurs in the 
process of creative destruction.1 Hayek explained the success of economic 
strategies, routines and institutions as the result of a discovery procedure 
and not of rational construction.
In our context, the contribution of evolutionary economics to competi-
tion law is to be scrutinized. Whereas Uwe Cantner describes the general 
framework, Wolfgang Kerber makes specific policy proposals. In section 2 
of these comments, the central subject will be discussed which is the impact 
of evolutionary thinking on merger control. In section 3, the consequences 
for Articles101 and 102 TFEU will be explored. Before drawing final con-
clusions, the consistency of evolutionary thinking with ‘interventionist’ 
competition policy has to be investigated.
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2.  THE IMPACT OF EVOLUTIONARY THINKING 
ON MERGER CONTROL: MAINTAINING 
A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SOURCES OF 
INNOVATION?
2.1. Effects of a Merger on Innovation
The contributions show that, for the purpose of merger control, innova-
tion may be used in two contradictory senses: on the one hand, a merger 
may lead to efficiency gains in the sphere of R&D, thus providing an 
argument in favour of the merger. Efficiency gains in this context may 
for instance follow from economies of scale and scope, the combination 
of complementary resources or the avoidance of cost duplication. On the 
other hand, the merger may restrict competition in R&D which may be 
negative for long-term consumer welfare.2
Cantner is sceptical about ‘the hypothesis that large size or concen-
trated markets lead to higher innovative activities’. He points to the 
OACK approach which underlines the importance of other factors, 
like for example technological opportunities and the conditions for the 
appropriation of innovation. Markets are considered as places for testing 
new ideas in a trial-and-error process. Kerber adds ‘that it might be an 
important task of competition policy to ensure a multiplicity and diversity 
of independently innovating firms since they are sources searching for 
new problem solutions and safeguarding the effectiveness of competition 
as a process of parallel experimentation and mutual learning’. This leads 
to another analogy to biology, i.e. to the merits of biodiversity. Kerber 
explores the possibilities of a diversity test.3 Should competition law guar-
antee a certain multiplicity and diversity of firms which independently 
search for new solutions? Is it possible to determine an optimal number of 
parallel experimenting firms?
2.2. The ‘4-plus-test’ as a Proxy for the Effects on Innovation?
Kerber makes reference to the ‘4-plus-test’ which stems from the 
US Licensing Guidelines (US Department of Justice, Federal Trade 
Commission 1995: para.  4.3) and basically says: there are normally no 
competitive concerns if there are at least four competing, i.e. substitut-
able, technologies. The European Commission has integrated the ‘4-plus-
test’ into the Guidelines on technology transfer agreements (European 
Commission 2004a, TOT Guidelines). In the context of restrictive licens-
ing agreements, the ‘4-plus-test’ serves as a kind of ‘soft’ safe harbour. 
According to the TOT Guidelines (n. 131), ‘outside the area of hardcore 
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restrictions [Article  101 TFEU] is unlikely to be infringed where there 
are four or more independently controlled technologies in addition to 
the technologies controlled by the parties to the agreement that may be 
substitutable for the licensed technology at a comparable cost to the user’.
The question arises whether this test could be transferred to merger 
control in order to give more guidance as regards the impact of a merger 
on innovation. An argument in favour of such an adoption is the relation-
ship between Article  101 TFEU and merger control: the conditions for 
the prohibition of a merger (or for the necessity of commitments by the 
merging entities) are higher than the requirements of Article 101 TFEU: 
whereas a merger can be prohibited only if it significantly impedes effec-
tive competition (for example as a result of the creation or strengthening 
of a dominant position), restrictive agreements are illegal if they have 
as their object or effect an appreciable restriction of competition within 
the common market and if they are not justified by reasons of economic 
efficiency in the sense of Article 101(3) TFEU. One could argue that if the 
‘4-plus-test’ grants a safe harbour to restrictive agreements it should all 
the more favour a concentration since the prohibition of a merger requires 
stricter conditions.
On the other hand, in the field of licensing agreements, characterized 
by contracts containing numerous standardized clauses, the need for 
schematic solutions is much higher than in the case of merger control. 
In merger cases, the impact on innovation is case-specific. Moreover, the 
effect of mergers on innovation is only one aspect among many and should 
not predetermine the outcome of an overall analysis. Therefore, in my 
view, the ‘4-plus-test’ should not be given a decisive role in the sense of a 
safe harbour. Rather the general criteria of merger analysis should apply.
2.3. Innovation Considerations in the EC Merger Regulation (ECMR)
These general criteria provide a framework which is flexible enough to 
take into account the insights of evolutionary economics – and, actu-
ally, they are perfectly reflected in European merger control. According 
to Article  2(1)(b) ECMR, the European Commission has to take into 
account inter alia ‘the development of technical and economic progress 
provided that it is to the consumers’ advantage and does not form an 
obstacle to competition’. On the one hand, according to the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (European Commission 2004b: para. 81), consumers 
may ‘benefit from new or improved products or services, for instance those 
resulting from efficiency gains in the sphere of R&D and innovation.’ On 
the other hand, the joining of innovative power must not constitute an 
obstacle to effective competition.
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When assessing the degree of competitive pressure before and after the 
merger, actual and potential competition has to be analyzed. Regarding 
actual competition, market shares and concentration levels have to be 
determined. For concentration levels, the European Commission uses 
the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares 
of the individual market shares of all undertakings active on a certain 
market. The change in HHI due to the merger (‘Delta HHI’) is of par-
ticular relevance. In the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission 
has determined critical thresholds of HHI and Delta HHI. These values 
do not provide a presumption of dominance, but work as safe harbours. 
Below these thresholds, competitive concerns are unlikely (Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines: paras 19–21). However, low concentration levels and 
deltas cannot be relied upon if ‘one or more merging parties are important 
innovators in ways not reflected in market shares’ (Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: para. 20 lit. b).
As a result, the legal framework provides for sufficient space for long-
term innovation-oriented thinking. However, better use should be made 
of it in the future. The maintenance of effective competition in innovation 
should become a recognized feature of merger analysis. A merger should 
undergo particularly careful scrutiny if important innovators are involved. 
Thus, it would be guaranteed that the prominent role of ‘parallel experi-
mentation’ is sufficiently respected. Therefore, I agree with Cantner who 
cautions against static thinking based on an isolated application of the 
HHI.
2.4. The Concept of Innovation Markets
Closely linked to these reflections is the discussion on the existence of 
innovation markets. Are there separate innovation markets which are 
upstream to technology and product markets? According to the definition 
in the US Licensing Guidelines (n. 3.2.3), an ‘innovation market consists 
of the research and development directed to particular new or improved 
goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and devel-
opment’. The concept of innovation markets is highly relevant for our 
context. If this approach is followed no detour over technology or product 
markets has to be made, but it is possible directly to discern the impact on 
these innovation markets.
Although the concept of innovation markets is related to a diversity 
test, Kerber criticizes the lack of theoretical foundation and application 
problems of the innovation market concept and prefers the evolution-
ary model of competition as a process of experimentation. This view 
backs the lessons from competition law experience. It is very difficult for 
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competition authorities to identify parallel R&D and to assess the pros-
pect of success of these activities (Ullrich 1999: 279 et seq.).4 Therefore, 
innovation considerations should rather be integrated into the analysis of 
the merger’s effect on product and technology markets within the concept 
of potential competition.
3.  ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU AND THE 
APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS)
3.1. The Significance of Evolutionary Thinking for the Competition Rules
Evolutionary economics seem to be used to show that one of the tasks 
of merger control is maintaining a minimum number of actors in order 
to maintain a sufficient degree of parallel experimentation. The question 
has to be asked if the contribution of evolutionary economics is restricted 
to the area of merger control or if the concept may be used in the context 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU as well. It has already been noted that the 
‘4-plus-test’ is used as a safe harbour when assessing licensing agreements. 
As regards the relationship between merger control and competition rules, 
it is often said that merger control is more future-oriented than the com-
petition rules are, since Articles 101 and 102 TFEU constitute an ex post 
control.
In my view, this starting point seems questionable, not only but most 
notably in the field of innovation-oriented activities like licensing con-
tracts or the application of Article 102 TFEU to the IT sector. One of the 
standard accusations against competition law in this field is that short- 
or medium-term effects are preferred to a long-term perspective taking 
into account the prospective consequences for creativity and innovation. 
Whenever competition law is applied to IPRs, the critique says that only 
static competition by imitation is enhanced to the prejudice of dynamic 
competition by innovation. It is of utmost importance for competition 
law to show that this critique is unfounded. Therefore, long-term thinking 
including effects on innovation must not be restricted to merger control 
but extended to the general competition rules. This may be illustrated by 
two cases, the Spanish Glaxo case as an example of Article 101 TFEU, and 
the Microsoft case as an Article 102 TFEU paradigm.
3.1.1. Dual pricing: the spanish Glaxo case
The Glaxo cases concern practices of a pharmaceutical producer which 
aim at reducing or eliminating parallel imports. In the Spanish case, the 
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European Commission prohibited a system of dual pricing according 
to which dealers in Spain had to pay a higher price for goods going to 
be exported than for goods that were to be sold in the Spanish market.5 
The ECJ confirmed the decision of the CFI which (partly) annulled the 
Commission’s decision.6 For our context, the innovation aspect is rel-
evant. According to the ECJ, the Commission did not sufficiently examine 
the question whether dual pricing improves innovation. Therefore, the 
Commission has to re-examine the application of Article  101(3) TFEU 
(ex-Article 81(3) EC).7
I agree that aspects of innovation should play a prominent role in the 
context of Article 101(3) TFEU. If a restriction of competition is neces-
sary to promote technical or economic progress, the restriction is justified 
if the further conditions of Article  101(3) TFEU are met. Therefore, if 
‘private export taxes’ are indispensable to promoting innovations in the 
pharmaceutical sector and if consumers receive a fair share of the resulting 
benefit etc., the pricing scheme is justified. The European Commission has 
analyzed this question and has come to the result that obstacles to parallel 
imports are not a suitable means to promote R&D.8 The ECJ criticized 
the Commission’s analysis as insufficient. In my view, the Commission’s 
reasoning is detailed enough and convincing. The ECJ should respect its 
own starting point that complex economic assessments are subject only to 
a confined control.9 In our context the fact is important that the impact 
of certain practices on innovation should play a major role not only in 
merger control but also in Article 101 TFEU cases.
3.1.2. An example of Article 102 TFEU: the Microsoft case
As is well known, the European Commission fined Microsoft for the 
abuse of a dominant position.10 According to the Commission’s findings, 
confirmed by the European Court of First Instance,11 Microsoft extended 
the dominant position in the market for operating systems into the market 
for work group server operating systems by establishing ‘privileged con-
nections between its dominant client PC operating system and its work 
group server operating system’.12 Moreover, the tying of Windows and 
the Windows Media Player (WMP) was found to be an abuse since the 
ubiquitous presence of WMP ‘creates disincentives for OEMs to ship 
third party streaming media players pre-installed on their PCs, and harms 
 competition in the market for streaming media players’.13
Aspects of innovation play a prominent role in this case. Microsoft 
had put forward the argument that granting access to its technology 
would destroy the incentives to innovate in the future. The European 
Commission and the CFI rejected this allegation as too ‘vague, general 
and theoretical’.14 Microsoft had not specified the argument. Whereas the 
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burden of proof regarding the existence of a dominant position and of 
an abuse is on the competition authority, the dominant enterprise has ‘to 
raise any plea of objective justification and to support it with arguments 
and evidence’.15
It follows from the Microsoft case that it is not sufficient to point to 
the reputedly negative consequences of competition law’s application for 
innovation, but it has to be shown what exactly is meant by this causal 
relationship. Moreover, the competition authority still has the chance 
‘to show that the arguments and evidence relied on by the undertaking 
cannot prevail and, accordingly, that the justification put forward cannot 
be accepted’.16
In this context, it is important to note that the application of competi-
tion law may increase the incentives to innovate not only of competitors 
but also of the dominant firm itself. It has to develop stronger innovative 
efforts if it is exposed to competition at least in neighbouring markets. 
The same is true for the dominated market itself: the incumbent will be 
much more creative if its monopoly (very often based on network effects) 
is menaced by substitution, at least in the long run.
In sum, it would not be correct to say that the effects on innovation are 
not taken into account by the European Commission. The contrary is the 
case: the Commission and the CFI carefully assess the effects on incentives 
to innovate when establishing an abuse in the sense of Article 102 TFEU. 
However, there is a problem regarding innovation when it comes to the 
legal consequences of the infringement. The European Commission (again 
confirmed by the CFI) imposed on Microsoft the obligation to offer a 
Windows version in Europe without the media player. Not to mention the 
fact that this injunction was ineffective since the full version was sold at the 
same price as the version without media player; this remedy restricts tech-
nological development. It seems to mean that whenever the network effect 
leads to the ubiquity of a certain product, the dominant firm is no longer 
free to integrate new features into the system. Such a far-reaching conse-
quence would indeed constitute an obstacle to further innovations. This 
path should not be followed. Aspects of innovation should be taken into 
account not only when establishing an abuse but also when determining 
remedies. What is needed are ‘smart sanctions’. Barriers to entry should be 
lowered for example by imposing a ‘must carry’ duty committing the domi-
nant enterprise to distribute the competing products together with its own.
It is interesting to note that in the browser proceedings against 
Microsoft, the European Commission seems to say goodbye to unbun-
dling obligations. The Commission criticized Microsoft for planning a 
Windows version without a browser and suggested a ‘ballot screen’ pre-
senting different browsers to end-users, thus increasing consumer choice.17 
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This approach is to be welcomed: Thus, aspects of innovation are taken 
into account not only when interpreting the abuse prohibition but also 
when it comes to the elaboration of appropriate remedies.
3.2. The Article 102 TFEU Paper of the Commission
In its Guidance on Article  102 TFEU (ex-Article 82 EC) enforcement 
priorities,18 the European Commission has eventually renounced separate 
sections on the refusal to licence IPRs and the refusal to supply interface 
information.19 Instead, these practices are integrated in the general reflec-
tions on refusal to supply.20 The effects of competition law application on 
incentives to innovate are reflected.21 The result does not entail a complete 
abstention from competition law intervention but it subjects the applica-
tion of Article  102 TFEU to detailed conditions. These conditions are 
directly borrowed from the ECJ case law in Magill, IMS Health, Microsoft 
and others. The section on tying and bundling,22 however, does not 
contain reflections on the influence of tying prohibitions on incentives to 
innovate. Thus, the opportunity to correct the weak point of the Microsoft 
decision is missed.
3.3. The Scope of IPRs
Not only is the application of competition law, but also the definition of 
IPRs is of great influence for incentives to innovate. Cantner mentions 
that ‘weak intellectual property rights or less complex (and easier to grasp) 
new knowledge offer more opportunities for potential entrants to enter’. 
This leads to the question to what extent evolutionary economics should 
be applied not only to the interpretation of competition law but also to the 
design and the scope of IPRs. In my view, similar questions arise in this 
context. The scope of IPRs has a strong influence on the process of parallel 
experimentation, variation and selection, by influencing the competitors’ 
radius of operation. The discussion on the relevance of economic insights 
for the legal system should not be restricted to competition law, but 
extended to the field of intellectual property protection. Some problems 
of competition law – albeit certainly not all of them – could be avoided if 
legislators designing IPR regimes and lawyers interpreting IPRs took the 
competitive process into account.
3.4. Summary
The focus of evolutionary economics applied to competition law seems to 
be on merger control. As we stand at the beginning of testing the suitability 
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of evolutionary thinking in competition policy, this seems acceptable as a 
starting point. Yet, there is no deeper reason for restricting evolutionary 
economics to merger control. On the contrary, the long-term perspective 
of the evolutionary concept could contribute to the entire field of compe-
tition law by invalidating an argument frequently put forward, namely 
that competition law turns a blind eye to long-term effects on innovation. 
Evolutionary economics may be helpful in order to strengthen the long-
term perspective in applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The most recent 
Microsoft case in Europe (dealing with the integration of the browser into 
the operating system) shows that the European Commission is becoming 
more sensitive to the effects on innovation, although this aspect is not yet 
fully developed in the Article 102 TFEU guidance paper.
4.  THE CONSISTENCY OF EVOLUTIONARY 
THINKING WITH ‘INTERVENTIONIST’ 
COMPETITION POLICY
One of the most surprising results of the application of evolutionary 
economics to the field of competition policy is the following paradox: 
although Hayek is close to Chicago School reasoning which is opposed 
to the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm of the Harvard 
School, evolutionary thinking and the view of competition as a discovery 
procedure can apparently be used to promote ‘structural’ concepts like 
the diversity test. This can best be illustrated by Kerber’s suggestion ‘to 
ensure a multiplicity and diversity of independently innovating firms since 
they are sources searching for new problem solutions and safeguarding the 
effectiveness of competition as a process of parallel experimentation and 
mutual learning’.
At first sight, there seems to be the following contradiction: compe-
tition policy does not completely rely on spontaneous variations and 
their success in the market. Competition policy tends to guarantee the 
framework and not to leave everything to the discretion of market partici-
pants. Maintaining a minimum number of firms as independent sources 
of searching solutions may be an important task of competition policy. 
However, in my view, this goal is only compatible with evolutionary think-
ing if this is interpreted in a conditional way (Vanberg 1994: 29 et seq.). 
Spontaneous evolution should be relied upon only if this process is gov-
erned by certain restrictions. Competition law is part of the legal frame-
work that market participants have to respect. Rules should be designed in 
a way that guarantees the competitive process in the future. If evolution-
ary thinking is restricted in this sense to the economic interactions within 
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a certain framework, the tension between evolutionary economics and 
‘interventionist’ competition policy can be solved.
As a result, this means that evolutionary thinking is suitable to explain 
the competitive process, but does not serve as a comprehensive rationale 
for competition policy. It is the very goal of competition policy to limit 
the evolutionary process by giving and enforcing rules for market partici-
pants. Therefore, there are trials and errors that should not be tested. The 
analogy to biology has its limits, as always in a socio-cultural context.
5. CONCLUSION
Evolutionary economics brings a new aspect to competition law: used to 
a greater or lesser extent to take into account the insights of Industrial 
Organization with its focus on game theory and price effects, a broader 
perspective is developed. It is the long temporal horizon which is charac-
teristic for evolutionary economics. The more economic approach is criti-
cized for its short-term perspective. Instead, the effects on innovation as a 
key component of evolution take centre stage.
It is important to integrate long-term reflections into competition law 
analysis. However, the long-term orientation may at the same time consti-
tute an obstacle to the application of competition law. There is a practical 
need not to rely on developments which are too remote in the future. This 
is the reason the European Commission provides for time-limits in its 
guidelines. According to the TOT Guidelines (para. 138), entry barriers 
are low if market entry by potential competitors is expected within one or 
two years. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines consider market entry to be 
timely if it occurs within two years (para. 74).
Evolutionary economics seems to give a structural response to the long-
term challenge. As it is not possible to make reliable predictions on the 
evolution of innovation, the conditions for innovative efforts come to the 
fore. Cantner and Kerber are rather sceptical as regards the innovation-
enhancing effect of concentration. Instead, the importance of parallel 
experimentation and the existence of competing innovators are under-
lined. This leads to recommendations which would rather be associated 
with Harvard School thinking than with Schumpeter and Hayek. As a 
result, it is not dynamic efficiency which competition law should directly 
be aiming at but the maintenance of market structures which favour 
creativity.
Evolutionary economics puts special emphasis on the dynamic dimen-
sion of competition policy and moves the effects on innovation from 
the periphery to the centre. At the same time, the analysis is refined: the 
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one-sided perception of competition law as a danger to innovation is 
overcome. The negative effects of mergers and restrictive behaviour on 
the generation of knowledge get the same attention. Thus, evolutionary 
economics helps to strengthen the basis for long-term thinking in competi-
tion law. Although the way towards workable concepts is still long, the 
evolutionary approach seems promising and should be pursued.
NOTES
 1. For a more detailed description see Cantner, ch. 8 this volume: whereas the young 
Schumpeter considered small firms to be the main actors of innovation, he later saw 
large firms as the main drivers of technological change.
 2. Mergers do not necessarily restrict the number of research paths since parallel experi-
mentation may continue within the merged entity. However, it is more probable for 
parallel experimentation to be continued if firms do not merge but create R&D joint 
ventures, see the analysis of Kerber in ch. 3.3.
 3. For further details Kerber refers to the inquiry of Linge (2008).
 4. Even in the US, the concept of innovation markets is used rather reluctantly; see for 
example the statement of then FTC Chairman T. Muris in Federal Trade Commission 
of 13 January 2004, Genzyme/Novazyme, www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/murisgenzymestmt.
pdf, pp. 2 et seq.
 It is worth noting that in the Genzyme case, the Commissioners were in disagreement 
about the relationship of concentration and innovation. The majority rejected any pre-
sumptions on the impact of concentration on innovation and pointed to the necessity of 
a case-by-case inquiry. The minority opinion argues in support of such a presumption. 
See the analysis of Katz and Shelanski (2007) at IX B. Katz and Shelanski recommend 
a presumption of harm in the case of mergers to monopoly.
 5. European Commission of 8 May 2001, Decision 2001/791/EG – Glaxo Wellcome, OJ of 
17 November 2001, L 302/1.
 6. Cases C–501/06, GlaxoSmithKline [2009] ECR I-9291.
 7. Ibid.
 8. European Commission (supra note 5), para. 153 et seq.
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10. European Commission of 24 March 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 – Microsoft, http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
11. CFI Case T–201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601.
12. European Commission (supra note 10), para. 1064.
13. Ibid., para. 1066.
14. Microsoft – CFI (supra note 11), para. 698.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. European Commission of 16 December 2009, Case COMP/C-3/39.530 – Microsoft, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/39530/final_decision_en.pdf.
18. European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Enterprises, OJ of 24 February 2009, C 45/7.
19. Initially, such sections were part of the discussion paper of 2005: see European 
Commission, DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to Exclusionary Practices, December 2005, sections 9.2.2.6 and 9.2.3, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.
20. European Commission, Article 82 of the EC Treaty (supra note 18), para. 78.
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21. See paras 75, 82, 87, 89–90 of the Guidance Paper (supra note 18).
22. Ibid., para. 47 et seq.
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